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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN COATING, INC., an Oregon 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GIBBONS and REED COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; and AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 880289 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under the provisions of Article 
VIII, Section 3, Utah Constitution, and 78-2-2(3)(j) , Utah Code 
Annotated. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellant, Western Coating, sued Gibbons and Reed Company, 
as principal, and American Insurance Company, as surety, on a 
payment bond furnished to the Utah Department of Transportation 
in connection with a road-building project, for the value of 
reinforcing steel sold to defendant Continental-Hagen, a supplier 
to a subcontractor of Gibbons and Reed. Gibbons and Reed 
cross-claimed against Continental-Hagen. A default judgment was 
taken by Western Coating against Continental-Hagen. Thereafter, 
on motion of Gibbons and Reed and American Insurance, the court 
granted, summary judgment dismissing Western Coating's action 
against them, and Gibbons and Reed's cross-claim against 
Continental-Hagen. Western Coating filed a timely appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether Western Coating, a supplier to a supplier to a sub-
contractor of Gibbons and Reed Company was a beneficiary of the 
payment bond provided to the Utah Department of Transportation. 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
The controlling statute is Section 63-56-38, Utah Code Anno-
tated, a part of the Utah Procurement Code. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with the statement of facts of Western 
Coating except the statement that the bond was for the protection 
of "those supplying labor and materials to the project," the 
extent of that protection being the issue in this case. An addi-
tional fact, not mentioned by Western Coating, is that all sums 
that were due to Gibbons and Reed's subcontractor, Pacheco & 
Martinez, were paid (R.38, par.11, R.60). 
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT 
Between 1963 and 1980, when the Utah Procurement Code was 
adopted, the requirements for payment bonds on public construc-
tion contracts were set out in Section 14-1-6, Utah Code Anno-
tated. The section was repealed in 1980 when a modified 
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provision relating to bonding for public contracts was enacted 
and incorporated into the Utah Procurement Code as Section 
63-56-38. 
The Utah Procurement Code provision made substantial changes 
in language, indicating an intention on the part of the Utah leg-
islature to limit the class of beneficiaries of payment bonds. 
Prior to adoption of Section 14-1-6, federal decisions under the 
Miller Act (40 U.S.C. §S 270a-270d) did not protect every person 
who furnished labor and materials for a public project, but only 
those who had a contract with the contractor or the contractor's 
subcontractor. The federal law on payment bonds was well known 
prior to adoption of the procurement code, and the language used 
in the procurement code suggests that the code provisions were 
meant to have a scope similar to that of the Miller Act. Although 
the federal decisions are not controlling, they are very persua-
sive with respect to legislative intent. 
The inability of a contractor to anticipate the claims that 
it may have to pay if the bonding statute reaches too far, and 
the fact that the contractor's property is not improved differen-
tiate bond cases from mechanics1 lien cases. 
Although a few other states have interpreted payment bond 
statutes as protecting lower tier suppliers, the wording of state 
statutes varies, as does their legislative history, and Utah 
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courts should attempt to find to the intention of the Utah legis-
lature under accepted rules of statutory construction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Interpretation of the Miller Act by the Federal 
Courts, Though Not Conclusive, is Persuasive and Should 
be Followed. 
The federal Miller Act (40 U.S.C. SS 270a-270d) was enacted 
in 1935, and in 1944 the United States Supreme Court in Clifford 
L. MacEvoy Co. v^ United States, 322 U.S. 102, 64 S.Ct. 890, 88 
L.Ed. 1163, placed a significant limitation on the types of sup-
pliers who are beneficiaries of Miller Act payment bonds. The 
issue presented in MacEvoy was whether a person supplying mate-
rial to a materialman of a government contractor could recover on 
the payment bond, and the United States Supreme Court said he 
could not, noting that although the payment bond was ostensibly 
for the protection of "all persons supplying labor and material 
in the prosecution of the work" the notice provision of Section 
2(a) limited rights under the payment bond to (1) those material-
men, laborers, and subcontractors who dealt directly with prime 
contractors, and (2) those materialmen, laborers and subcontrac-
tors who, lacking express or implied contractual relationship 
with prime contractors, had direct contractual relationships with 
subcontractors of prime contractors. 
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The court said that to allow those in more remote relation-
ships to recover on the bond would be contrary to the clear lan-
guage of the proviso and the express will of Congress, and would 
lead to the absurd result of requiring notice from persons in 
direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor, but not 
requiring notice from more remote claimants. The court observed 
that in the established usage of the building trades, a subcon-
tractor is one who performs for, and takes from the prime con-
tractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of 
the original contract, thus excluding ordinary laborers and 
materialmen. 
After MacEvoyf a large majority of the United States courts 
of appeal and district courts took the position that suppliers or 
subcontractors of sub-subcontractors were not covered by the pro-
visions of the bond. See Annotation, Protection Under Bond Given 
Under Miller Act [40 U.S.C., §§ 270a-270e3 of One Supplying 
Labor or Material to One Other than the Prime Contractor or his 
Immediate Subcontractor, 79 A.L.R.2d 852. 
Utah's Section 14-1-6, adopted 19 years after the decision 
in MacEvoyf contained language essentially the same as that 
relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in deciding 
MacEvoy. Compare the following excerpts: 
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Miller Act [40 U.S.C. S 270b] 
Every person who has furnished labor or material in the 
prosecution of the work provided for in such contract, in 
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this act 
and who has not been paid in full therefor before the expi-
ration of a period of ninety days after the day on which the 
last of the labor was done or performed by him or material 
was furnished or supplied by him for which such claim is 
made, shall have the right to sue on such payment bond for 
the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of 
institution of such suit and to prosecute said action to 
final execution and judgment for the sum or sums justly due 
him: Provided, however, That any person having direct con-
tractual relationship with a subcontractor but no contrac-
tual relationship express or implied with the contractor 
furnishing said payment bond shall have a right of action 
upon the said payment bond upon giving written notice to 
said contractor within ninety days from the date on which 
such person did or performed the last of the labor or fur-
nished or supplied the last of the material for which such 
claim is made, * * * . 
Little Miller Act [14-1-6, U.C.A. 1953] 
Every claimant who has furnished labor or material in the 
prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in 
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this act, 
and who has not been paid in full therefor before the expi-
ration of a period of ninety days after the day on which the 
last of the labor was done or performed by him or material 
was furnished or supplied by him for which such claim is 
made, shall have the right to sue on such payment bond for 
the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of 
institution of such suit and to prosecute such action to 
final judgment for the sum or sums justly due him and have 
execution thereon; provided, however, that any such claimant 
having a direct contractual relationship with a subcontrac-
tor of the contractor furnishing such payment bond but no 
contractual relationship expressed or implied with such con-
tractor shall not have a right of action upon such payment 
bond unless he has given written notice to such contractor 
within ninety days from the date on which such claimant per-
formed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the 
last of the material for which such claim is made, 
* • * 
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It is clear that the foregoing provisions of the earlier 
Utah statute were copied from the federal legislation, the only 
material change being use of "claimant" instead of "person," and 
it is clear that the interpretation of the Miller Act by the 
United States Supreme Court should be followed even if 14-1-6 had 
not been replaced by 63-56-38. Because of the similarity of the 
language and the fact that MacEvoy was decided 19 years before 
adoption of 14-1-6, the federal interpretations of the Miller Act 
prior to 1963 should be very persuasive in interpreting the Utah 
provision. 
In City of Weippe v. Yarno, 96 Ida. 319, 528 P.2d 201, 203 
(1974), the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to determine 
whether items furnished for a construction project were "materi-
als" within the meaning of the Idaho statute based on the Miller 
Act. The court relied on prior federal decisions, saying: 
A statute which is adopted from another jurisdiction, 
including federal statutes adopted by a state, will be pre-
sumed to be adopted with the prior construction placed upon 
it by the courts of the other jurisdictions. 
The case was followed by the United States Court of Appeals 
of the Ninth Circuit in Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 
1279 (1978), a diversity case. 
Another question of statutory construction was before the 
Arizona Supreme Court in Western Asbestos Co. v. TGK Construction 
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Co., Inc., 121 Ariz. 388, 590 P.2d 927, 929 (1979). The court 
said: 
• * * *
 w e note that our statute is modeled after the fed-
eral statute, the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. S 270a, et seg., and 
decisions concerning notice under the federal statute are 
persuasive in interpreting our so-called "Little Miller 
Act." 
We have found no Utah cases dealing with the effect to be 
given to the Miller Act in interpreting Utah's public bonding 
statute, but the court has considered and relied upon federal 
decisions in construing Utah statutes based upon the federal 
labor and tax statutes. Southeast Furniture Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 100 Utah 154, 111 P.2d 153, 154 (1941); American 
Foundry and Machine Co. v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 105 Utah 
83, 141 P.2d 390, 391 (1943); and Bennett Association v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 19 Utah 2d 108, 426 P.2d 812, 814 (1967). 
In Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903, 904 
(Utah 1984), this court stated: 
We recognize that when the legislature adopts a statute 
from another state, the presumption is that the legislature 
is familiar with that statefs judicial interpretations and 
statutes and intends to adopt them also. 
The court, however, declined to follow Wisconsin comparative neg-
ligence decisions, pointing out that the rule does not apply in 
certain instances, as where the adopting legislature has made 
material changes in the statute, or where construction of the 
- 8 -
statute by the other state was subsequent to its adoption by the 
Utah legislature — circumstances not present here. 
The Colorado, New Mexico and Massachusetts cases cited by 
Western Coating should not be taken as suggesting a different 
approach to application of Miller Act decisions. In South-Way 
Construction Co. v. Adams City Service, 169 Colo. 513, 458 P.2d 
250, 251 (1969), the Colorado court was dealing with a statute 
that had been enacted not later than 1923, 12 years before the 
Miller Act and had been construed by the Colorado court in 1925. 
Peters v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 389 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 
1979) refused to limit the term "subcontractor" to one having a 
contractual relationship with the contractor, but this was 
because of the 1910 case of Friedman v. County of Hampden, 204 
Mass. 494, 501-502 (1910), and a series of cases that had fol-
lowed it in which "subcontractor" was defined as "one who has 
entered into a contract, express or implied, for the performance 
of an act with a person who has already contracted for its per-
formance." The Massachusetts statute was not based on the Miller 
Act, and a long line of Massachusetts cases had made no distinc-
tion between tiers of subcontractors, sub-subcontractors and 
materialmen. In State of New Mexico ex. rel. W. M. Carroll & Co. 
v. K.L. House Construction Co., Inc., 99 N.M. 186, 656 P.2d 236 
(1982), the New Mexico Supreme Court decided that a third-tier 
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supplier was entitled to protection under New Mexico's Little 
Miller Act. One of the sections of the New Mexico statute, how-
ever, had language, unlike anything in the Utah statutes, which 
suggested a legislative intent to satisfy "all just claims" for 
materials and supplies furnished to the contractor or any subcon-
tractor. It is recognized that the statutes requiring payment 
bonds on public contracts have purposes similar to the mechanics 
lien statutes, but the statutes are not parallel. Some persons 
are protected under mechanics lien statutes who are not protected 
under bonding statutes, and some are protected under bonding-
statutes that are not protected under lien statutes. 
Thus, to recognize that the mechanic's lien statutes and the 
payment bond statutes have similar objectives, does not resolve 
questions as to the coverage of statutory payment bonds. As this 
court said in Stanton Transportation Co, v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 
341 P.2d 207, 210 (1959): 
While it is true that our statutes are to be liberally 
construed to give effect to their purpose and to promote 
justice, it is equally true that they should not be dis-
torted beyond the intent of the legislature. This principle 
is particularly applicable in a situation of this kind where 
a liability is imposed upon the property owner beyond what 
he contracted to bear for the improvement of his property. 
In order to impose upon him such additional burdens, the law 
must clearly spell out the responsibility. Otherwise, the 
entering into a contract for the improvement of one's prop-
erty might open the door to unforeseeable risks for the 
property owner. 
- 10 -
A similar approach was taken by the United States Supreme Court 
in Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 64 
S.Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed. 1164, 1167 (1944), in which it was recognized 
that the Miller Act was entitled to a "liberal" construction to 
protect laborers and materialmen, but with a caveat that "such a 
salutary policy does not justify ignoring plain words of limita-
tion and imposing wholesale liability on payment bonds." 
In Graco Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Explora-
tion, Inc., 98 Utah Adv. Rpts. 28 (1988), this court noted that 
the purpose of the mechanics' lien statute is to prevent -a wind-
fall to property owners at the expense of equipment, material and 
labor suppliers. But a contractor is not in the same position as 
the owner of property, and does not ordinarily have a "windfall" 
if a supplier or laborer is not paid. In the present case, for 
instance, one of the established facts is that all of the amounts 
that were earned by Gibbons and Reed's subcontractor were paid, 
and if Western Coating's argument is accepted, the contractor 
will have to pay twice. It is common knowledge that surety com-
panies in writing payment bonds require indemnity from the con-
tracting principal. 
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II. 
Payment Bonds Furnished Pursuant to the Utah Procurement 
Code are not Intended to Protect Third-Tier Materialmen, 
Section 14-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, having been taken 
almost verbatim from the Miller Act, MacEvoy and its progeny, 
decided prior to adoption of 14-1-6, should be given considerable 
weight in determining the intent of the Utah legislature. If 
this case had been governed by 14-1-6, the trial court would have 
been correct in holding that Western Coating, a third-tier sup-
plier, was not a beneficiary of the payment bond furnished to the 
Department of Transportation. 
In 1980, 14-1-6 was repealed when the Utah Procurement Code 
was enacted, and although many of the provisions of 14-1-6 were 
carried over into the Utah Procurement Code, there were some sig-
nificant changes. 
Section 14-1-6 provided: 
Every claimant who has furnished labor and material in the 
prosecution of the work provided for in such contract in 
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this act, 
and who has not been paid in full therefor * * * shall have 
the right to sue on such payment bond. * * * 
Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Procurement Code provides: 
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the following 
bonds or securities shall be delivered to the state and 
shall be binding upon the parties upon execution of the 
contract: 
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(a) A performance bond * * *; and 
(b) A payment bond * * * for the protection of all 
persons supplying labor and material to the contractor 
or its subcontractors for the performance of the work 
provided for in the contract. 
(2) [Provision for waiver of bond.] 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the 
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided for in the 
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished 
under this section * * * may sue on the payment bond * * * . 
Two years prior to Utah's adoption of its Procurement Code, 
the United States Supreme Court had decided J. W. Bateson Co. v. 
Board of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 873, 55 L.Ed.2d 50, 55 
(1978). In that case recovery under a payment bond had been 
sought for an employee of a sub-subcontractor who had worked very 
closely on the construction project, and the United States Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals had held in favor of the 
employee. The United States Supreme Court reversed, saying: 
As we observed in Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 
ex rel. Calvin Tompkins Co., supra, Congress used the word 
"subcontractor" in the Miller Act in accordance with the 
"usage in the building trades." [Citations omitted.] In 
the building trades, 
a subcontractor is one who performs for and takes from 
the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or 
material requirements of the original contract. [Cita-
tion omitted.] 
It thus appears that a contract with a prime contractor is a 
prerequisite to being a "subcontractor." [Emphasis by the 
court.] 
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Whatever else can be said about the meaning of the Utah Pro-
curement Code, it cannot be said that it was intended to broaden 
the class of persons protected by payment bonds furnished in con-
nection with public contracts. The changes in language, however, 
make it unnecessary to determine whether Section 14-1-6 protected 
third-tier suppliers. It may be presumed that the legislature 
intended either to clarify the existing legislation relating to 
payment bonds or to change it. See 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, 
S 166. The new language indicates an intention on the part of 
the legislature to adopt federal interpretations of the Miller 
Act and to provide a cutoff point for contractor and surety 
liability. 
Under the necessary interpretation of the statute, 
Continental-Hagen was not a "subcontractor", and Western Coating 
cannot recover for materials furnished to Continental-Hagen. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah statutes requiring payment bonds for public projects, 
do not benefit third-tier suppliers of material. Inasmuch as the 
claim of Western Coating against Gibbons and Reed Company and 
American Insurance Company is based only on the payment bond 
(R.38, par.10, R.60), Western Coating is not entitled to recover, 
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and the summary judgment granted by the Third District Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BfyeiE Roe (Signed) 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, a 
Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Gibbons and Reed 
Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this £-0 day of January 1989, 
I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, four true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, to: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Mary Louise Lecheminant, Esq. 
Walstad & Babcock 
254 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
BWe e.fioe (Signed) 
BER:011389A 
- 15 -
